University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
UF Law Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional Change
Jonathan L. Marshfield
University of Florida Levin College of Law, marshfield@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub

Recommended Citation
Jonathan L. Marshfield, Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional Change, 65 Buff. L. Rev. 1057 (2017)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in UF Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF
Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

ESSAY
Respecting the Mystery of Constitutional
Change
JONATHAN L. MARSHFIELD†
In response to Richard Albert’s Quasi-Constitutional Amendments,
65 BUFF. L. REV. 739 (2017).

INTRODUCTION
All constitutions experience pressure to change.
Evolving social norms, technological advancements,
economic fluctuations, and myriad other circumstances put
pressure on constitutional rules to be updated or adjusted.1
The inevitable need for constitutional change is no secret nor
a recent realization. As Noah Webster argued in 1787,
changes in government are certain because it is impossible
to “prevent all changes in the wants, the inclinations, the
habits and the circumstances of people.”2
But constitutional systems respond to pressures for

† Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am very
grateful to Richard Albert and the Buffalo Law Review for inviting me to
comment on this important question of constitutional change.
1. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
81–83 (2009) (discussing the inevitable pressures for constitutional change); John
C. Calhoun, The Amending Process and the Theory of Concurrent Majorities, in
JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 79 (1992) (“It is wise, therefore, in every government, and especially in
a republic, to provide means for altering, and improving the fabric of government,
as time and experience, or the new phases of human affairs, may render
proper . . .”) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 679 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds.,1987)).
2. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787
377 (1998) (quoting Noah Webster, Government, AM. MAG. 1, 207 (1787–88)).
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change in different ways.3 Some constitutions make formal
amendment of the constitution’s text relatively easy and
politically accessible, which can encourage change through
textual amendments.4 The Indian Constitution, for example,
has been amended more than one hundred times since 1950.5
Those amendments address issues ranging from property
rights, free speech, social equality, recognition of new states,
taxation, official language status, legislative structure, and
judicial power (among many others).6
In many countries, however, constitutional change
occurs informally. Informal change happens when binding
constitutional rules are modified without any corresponding
alteration to the constitutional text.7 This can occur through
transformative judicial rulings that alter constitutional
meaning, “superstatutes” that are effectively entrenched
beyond ordinary politics, and momentous executive actions
that disturb constitutional conventions.8
In Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, Professor Richard
3. Some constitutions do not respond to pressures for constitutional change
at all (or at least insufficiently), but this generally contributes to constitutional
fatality. ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 81–88 (discussing relationship between
constitutional flexibility and mortality).
4. See generally Richard Albert, The Structure of Constitutional Amendment
Rules, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 913, 936–74 (2014) (describing the structure of
amendment rules around the world and discussing relative amendment rates).
5. The Constitution (Amendment) Acts, MINISTRY
http://indiacode.nic.in/coiweb/coifiles/amendment.htm.

L.

&

JUST.,

6. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 140–41, 151–57 (discussing India’s
amendment procedure and constitutional development). India’s frequent use of
formal amendment procedures is not unique—many countries around the world
experience frequent formal amendment. Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin,
American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1674–
75, 1676 tbl1. (2014).
7. Richard Albert, How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written
Constitutions, 38(2) DUBLIN U. L. J. 387, 388–89 (2015) (“An informal
[constitutional] change occurs where the enforceable meaning of the constitution
changes without altering the constitutional text.”).
8. Richard Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V,
94 Bos. U. L. REV. 1029, 1062–71 (2014) (describing these and other methods of
informal change).
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Albert provides an insightful and nuanced description of how
constitutional change can occur through an informal process
that he calls “quasi-constitutional amendment.”9 Quasiconstitutional
amendments
are
“sub-constitutional
change[s]” to existing constitutional norms that can become
functionally entrenched even though they are formally
vulnerable to ordinary statutory repeal or modification.10
Professor Albert illustrates this phenomenon by reference to
the Canadian Bill of Rights and the Regional Veto Law,
which were adopted through ordinary legislative processes
but have informally achieved constitutional status,11 and
Senate reform in Canada, which is an issue of constitutional
magnitude that has been addressed through an extra-legal
committee.12
Although Professor Albert draws on examples from
Canada, one of his core insights is that quasi-constitutional
amendment is not unique to Canadian constitutionalism.13
He finds evidence of similar phenomena in the United States,
Australia, and perhaps the United Kingdom.14 Wherever it
manifests, Professor Albert notes a common feature of quasiconstitutional amendment: it is “the result of a self-conscious
circumvention of onerous rules of formal amendment in
order to alter the operation of a set of existing norms in the
constitution.”15 Professor Albert explains that quasiconstitutional amendments occur because “constitutional
actors determine . . . that the current political landscape
would frustrate [their] plans for a constitutional
9. Richard Albert, Quasi-Constitutional Amendments, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 739,
739–40 (2017).
10. Id. at 740.
11. Id. at 740–41, (discussing the Canadian Bill of Rights); Id. at 745–46
(discussing the Regional Veto Law).
12. See id. at 748–49 (discussing Senate reform).
13. Id. at 743 (“I stress at the outset, however, that this phenomenon of quasiconstitutional amendment is not limited to Canada.”).
14. Id. at 743.
15. Id. at 741–42.
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amendment.”16 Since formal amendment is too difficult,
constitutional actors “resort instead to sub-constitutional
means—for instance, legislation or political practice—whose
success requires less or perhaps even no cross-party and
inter-institutional coordination.”17 In short, Professor Albert
observes that quasi-constitutional amendment is the
byproduct of high barriers to formal amendment.
This is surely an accurate and helpful description of how
quasi-constitutional amendments originate, but it raises
some more general questions about the interaction between
formal amendment and informal change that might have
more complicated answers. In this Essay, I briefly explore
the extent to which high barriers to formal amendment are
the driving force behind other informal processes of
constitutional change—especially informal change through
constitutional litigation.
Conventional theories of constitutional design suggest
that informal processes, especially transformative judicial
rulings, occur mostly because formal amendment is too
difficult.18 It is commonplace, for example, to attribute
informal change under the U.S. Constitution to Article V’s
seemingly insurmountable barriers to formal amendment.19
On these theories, informal change is understood mostly as
a byproduct of onerous formal amendment. Consequently,
these theories tend to assume that constitutional reformers
would prefer formal amendment if it was easier, and that
informal processes have nominal independent appeal. In
16. Id. at 742.
17. Id.
18. Heather K. Gerken, The Hydraulics of Constitutional Reform: A Skeptical
Response to Our Undemocratic Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 925, 933 (2007)
(“The simple point of my hydraulics argument is that an informal amendment
process exists because formal amendment is so difficult”); Donald S. Lutz,
Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 355, 358
(1994).
19. See Rosalind Dixon, Updating Constitutional Rules, SUP. CT. REV. 319,
319–20 (2009) (explaining that Article V’s rigidity has rerouted constitutional
change into judicial review and “superstatutes”).
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other words, informal amendment is viewed as a secondchoice alternative to formal amendment.
I am skeptical of these assumptions; at least at the level
of generality and universality that they often operate, and
especially as they apply to constitutional litigation as a
pathway to change. My skepticism is based mostly on
anecdotal evidence suggesting that the interaction between
formal and informal processes of constitutional change is
more complicated and nuanced than these theories suggest.20
There is evidence, for example, that even when formal
amendment is cheap and frequent, idiosyncrasies in political
culture can drive some constitutional issues towards
informal processes.21 Japan’s experience is suggestive of
this.22 Formal amendment is relatively easy under Japan’s
constitution, but it has never been amended.23 Instead,
significant constitutional change has been attempted
through awkward “reinterpretations” of the constitutional
text.24 Constitutional age might also play a role. As societies
stabilize and prosper under a particular constitution, they
might be less inclined to make explicit changes through
formal amendment and instead prefer change to occur
informally with a stronger appearance of continuity and

20. I have discussed my skepticism and the evidence supporting it in more
detail in two recent articles. See Jonathan L. Marshfield, The Amendment Effect,
98 BOS .U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Jonathan L. Marshfield, Courts and
Informal Constitutional Change in the States, 52 NEW.ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017).
21. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment
Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring
Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 686, 699–700 (2015).
22. See id. at 689 (describing Japan’s “[a]mendment [c]ulture” as “[u]ltra
[r]igid”).
23. Jonathan L. Marshfield, Decentralizing the Amendment Power, 19 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 963, 1018 (2015) (assessing Japan’s relative amendment
rigidity).
24. See Hajime Yamamoto, Interpretation of the Pacifist Article of the
Constitution by the Bureau of Cabinet Legislation: A New Source of Constitutional
Law?, 26 WASH. U. INT’L L. J. 99, 109–24 (2017).
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stability.25
Even if one assumes that barriers to constitutional
change are what drive reformers into either formal or
informal pathways, conventional theories often oversimplify
the salience of these barriers. Studies in this field often use
constitutional amendment rates between jurisdictions to
identify constitutions with relatively high and low barriers to
formal amendment. These studies then assume that
jurisdictions with higher barriers to formal amendment
should experience more informal change and jurisdictions
with lower barriers should experience less informal change.26
This, however, is an indirect measure of the most relevant
comparison. From the standpoint of a constitutional
reformer operating under a particular constitution, the most
relevant comparison is between the costs and benefits of
informal reform and the costs and benefits of formal
amendment under that constitution.
If we focus on that comparison, we can imagine scenarios
where reformers might elect informal processes over formal
amendment even when formal amendment is comparatively
easy. An individual suffering the deprivation of a previously
unrecognized civil right, for example, might view a
transformative court ruling recognizing a new civil liberty in
her particular circumstances as a more desirable pathway to
change than a generalized formal amendment that is subject
to the contingencies of future enforcement discretion and the
uncertainties of judicial interpretation in someone else’s
case. In other words, the forces that act on the pathways of
constitutional change can be highly contextual.
Frequent formal amendment might also alter the rules
of the game for constitutional reformers. Every new formal
25. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1460–63 (2001).
26. The classic example of this general methodology is Donald Lutz’s 1994
study. Lutz, supra note 18, at 358 (“A low amendment rate associated with a long
average constitutional duration strongly implies the use of some alternate means
of revision to supplement the formal amendment process.”).
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amendment will create political winners and losers—those
who supported the amendment and those who opposed it. If
we assume that the losers are unlikely to simply give up after
the amendment is adopted, then they are likely to find ways
to limit the amendment by influencing how it is enforced and
interpreted. This might spawn a series of informal changes
that chip away at the amendment’s original effect. This in
turn can instigate responsive formal amendments. The
result of this back-and-forth is an acceleration of formal and
informal changes.27
All of these factors (and surely some others) suggest that
the interaction between formal and informal processes of
constitutional change is complex; perhaps even to the point
of being mysterious. It can be hard to predict exactly how
constitutional change will percolate through any given set of
institutions under any particular set of circumstances. Many
forces act on the pathways of constitutional change, and the
study of comparative constitutional design should respect
and account for this complexity if it hopes to reliably inform
the design of amendment processes.
This Essay has three parts. In Part I, I briefly describe
prevailing notions regarding the interaction between formal
and informal processes of constitutional change. In Part II, I
explore some of the underappreciated factors that might act
on the pathways of constitutional change. Finally, I conclude
by considering what this complexity might mean for the field
of comparative constitutional design.
I. THE PREVAILING HYDRAULICS ANALOGY28
In an influential article, Professor Heather Gerken

27. See Gabriel L. Negretto, Replacing and Amending Constitutions: The
Logic of Constitutional Change in Latin America, 46 L. & SOC’Y REV. 749, 756
(2012) (finding evidence of this dynamic in serval Latin American countries).
28. This Part is not intended to provide an exhaustive summary of the
literature on this subject. It is only meant to illustrate the dominant perspective
reflected in much of the literature.
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analogized the pathways of constitutional change to the
operation of hydraulics.29 In this analogy, pressures for
constitutional change push reform towards the least
restrictive pathway.30 If formal amendment is easy, reform
will likely manifest in changes to the constitutional text.31 If
formal amendment is onerous, however, change will be rerouted into informal processes.32
Professor Gerken’s article was important because it
provided a useful way to think strategically about
amendment design. She specifically emphasized that the
hydraulics metaphor was helpful in assessing proposed
reforms to Article V’s amendment process.33 She argued that
proposals to liberalize Article V’s strictures must account for
the corresponding reduction in informal change that would
likely follow.34 In other words, if the pathways of
constitutional change are connected like hydraulic
chambers, blocking one chamber will necessarily divert the
flow of constitutional change towards other less obstructed
chambers, and, conversely, unblocking a chamber will
necessarily reduce flow through alternative chambers. This
analogy is useful from the standpoint of constitutional design
because it focuses designers on the normative question of
why constitutional change should be directed toward one or
another pathway.
Professor Gerken’s analogy is likely a very accurate
account of constitutional change under the U.S.
Constitution. However, as I have noted elsewhere, the
29. Gerken, supra note 18, at 927, 933.
30. Id. at 937
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id. at 933.
34. Id. at 927. (“What I want to suggest . . . is that by blocking most formal
amendments, Article V effectively redirects those constitutional energies into
different, potentially more productive channels. If there are benefits to
channeling constitutional discourse through the informal amendment process,
then the case for [liberalized formal amendment] is more complex . . .”).
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American experience is probably a poor sample from which
to extrapolate broader theories regarding the interaction
between formal and informal amendment.35 Article V’s
amendment process is a global outlier and unrepresentative
of how most national constitutions structure the amendment
power.36 The U.S. Constitution is also an incomplete
representation of American public law because it excludes
state constitutions, which operate very differently but are
essential to the constitutional structure. One would think,
therefore,
that
broader theories
of
comparative
constitutional design would be based on more nuanced and
representative ideas.
The dominant view amongst constitutional designers
and consultants, however, seems to track Professor Gerken’s
hydraulics metaphor rather closely. The Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance, for example, has issued
a “constitution-building primer” addressing the design of
formal amendment rules.37 Although the primer references
various factors that might affect the trajectory of
constitutional change, it concludes that, “[i]n general, the
more difficult it is to formally amend the constitution, the
more likely it is that adjustments will be made through
judicial
interpretation.”38
Similarly,
the
Venice
Commission’s 2009 Report on Constitutional Amendment
asserts:
The more difficult it is to amend a given constitution, the more
likely it is that calls for change will be channeled into legal action,
and the more likely the courts will be to follow such invitations. This
will in turn reduce the need for formal amendment. On the other
hand, in a system with flexible rules on amendment, the need for
dynamic judicial interpretation will be less, and so often also the
35. See Marshfield, Courts and Informal Constitutional Change, supra note
20, at 19–20.
36. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of The United
States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 807 (2012).
37. INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY & ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT PROCEDURES 1 (2014).
38. Id. at 13.
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legitimacy. The interaction and possible mutual compensation effects between the two are complex, and clearly varies from country
to country.39

This general guidance has not been lost to constitution
makers around the world. There is mounting evidence that
constitutional
designers craft flexible amendment
procedures with the aspiration of limiting informal processes
of constitutional change.40
Scholars have also tended to assume a rather generic
relationship between formal amendment frequency and
informal change. Donald Lutz conducted a well-known study
that is illustrative in this regard.41 Lutz sought to
understand how variations in the design of formal
amendment rules affect the actual practice of constitutional
change.42 He aspired “to provide guidelines for constitutional
design in any context—guidelines that will allow framers to
link the design of a formal amendment process securely to
desired outcomes.”43 To do this, Lutz studied amendment
rates under all fifty state constitutions as well as thirty
national constitutions from high-functioning democracies.44
Through his research, Lutz found a correlation between
the frequency of formal amendment and certain design
features in formal amendment rules.45 He also found a
correlation between formal amendment frequency and
constitutional lifespan.46 Lutz did not find, however, any
empirical support for the idea that amendment frequency

39. VENICE COMM’N, REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 22–23 (2009).
40. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward
an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 657, 660
(2016).
41. See Lutz, supra note 18, at 356–57.
42. Id. at 355.
43. Id. at 357.
44. Id. at 355, 357.
45. Id. at 358.
46. Id. at 358.
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and informal change are systematically connected in the way
suggested by Professor Gerken’s hydraulics analogy. He
nevertheless concluded that “the lower the rate of formal
amendment, the more likely the process [of constitutional
change] is dominated by a judicial body.”47 This conclusion
was supported only by an anecdotal “observation that the
United States has both a low amendment rate and a
judiciary that uses interpretive means to effect
constitutional change.”48 Indeed, subsequent studies have
noted that although Lutz hypothesized a negative correlation
between formal amendment and informal change, “this
proposition is one that we need to take on faith.”49
In sum, the dominant approach to the relationship
between formal amendment frequency and informal change
is to assume a rather generic and general inverse
relationship between the two. If formal amendment is easy
and frequent, informal change is likely minimal and
presumed to be unnecessary. Conversely, if informal
processes dominate change, this is presumed to be caused by
blocked processes of formal amendment. Although these
dynamics might explain constitutional change in some
countries, they beg for a more critical and nuanced analysis.
II. SOME UNDERAPPRECIATED INFLUENCES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
High barriers to formal amendment are surely a relevant
factor in understanding how constitutional change is
directed, but I am skeptical that it is the only meaningful
factor in many constitutional democracies. Constitutional
reformers might prefer informal processes of constitutional
change for a variety of reasons unrelated (or at least
indirectly related) to high barriers to formal amendment. If

47. Id. at 365.
48. John Ferejohn, The Politics of Imperfection: The Amendment of
Constitutions, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501, 525 (1997) (critiquing Lutz).
49. Id.
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this is true, constitutional design strategies need to rely less
on a simplistic hydraulics theory of constitutional change
and work to demystify the other factors influencing change.
In this Part, I suggest a few alternative factors that might be
at work in this regard: (1) constitutional maturity and
culture; (2) hydraulics from the reformer’s perspective; and
(3) political strategy.
A. Constitutional Maturity and Culture
All else being equal, the pathways of constitutional
change might be influenced by a society’s constitutional
maturity and political culture. David Strauss famously
argued that formal amendment is largely irrelevant in “a
mature democratic society.”50 He explained that when
democracies are young, formal texts are more important for
fostering the rule of law because young democratic societies
do not yet have a shared understanding for how to conduct
politics.51 Written texts help develop this trust and public
understanding by providing a common point of reference for
ordering politics.52 By this logic, codification of constitutional
law is a high priority in the early stages of a democracy
because textual amendments build trust and understanding
by making constitutional law explicit.
Conversely, as a society matures around democratic
principles, it operates more like parties to a “long-term
contractual agreement” where the parties do not require
every change in their day-to-day dealings to be put in
writing.53
Instead,
they
develop
extra-textual
understandings that flow from their frequent and continuous
interactions.54 Thus, according to Strauss, “in a mature
society, people accept the acts of legislatures, courts, and
50. Strauss, supra note 25, at 1460.
51. Id. at 1462.
52. Id. at 1460–61.
53. Id. at 1462.
54. Id. at 1462.
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executive agencies—and the political and non-political acts
of their fellow citizens—even when those acts augment or
arguably conflict with the foundational text.”55
Although I am doubtful of Strauss’s ultimate conclusion
that formal amendments are irrelevant, his suggestion that
formal amendments become less salient as constitutional
democracies mature seems plausible. To be sure, even
mature democracies can experience crises that re-invigorate
the salience of formal amendments (the Reconstruction
Amendments are perhaps an example of this); but it seems
plausible that mature constitutional democracies tend to
handle more constitutional change through informal
processes than do fledgling democracies.
Strauss’s claim is difficult to assess empirically.
Amendments to the United States Constitution have
certainly decelerated over time.56 Other mature democracies,
however, display different trends. Norway, for example, has
the second oldest national constitution in the world, but
there were only two amendments during the constitution’s
first thirty-six years.57 After those initial decades, Norway’s
amendment activity increased and remains at a rather stable
rate of about one amendment event every 2.4 years.58 Indeed,
the longest gap between amendments during that period was
nine years and the median gap between amendments was

55. Id.
56. Albert, supra note 8, at 1045 (“The pace of formal amendment in the
United States is decelerating.”). There are, of course, many alternative
explanations for this. See Rosalind Dixon, Partial Constitutional Amendments,
13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 643, 651–64 (2011) (explaining that the addition of new
states has effectively increased the thresholds for ratification and proposal under
Article V).
57. Data for these calculations are from Comparative Constitution Project
database. ZACHARY ELKINS ET. AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT:
CHRONOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVENTS (2014), https://www.comparative
conctitutionsproject.org/chronology. [hereinafter Chronology of Constitutional
Events].
58. Id.
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two years.59 In any event, Strauss raises the possibility that
even if barriers to formal amendment are low, constitutional
maturity might foster a general disinterest in formal
amendment and a preference for informal processes.60
Constitutional culture might also affect the pathways of
change. Societies can develop idiosyncratic collective
preferences for how they prefer to manage constitutional
reform.61 Japan’s experience with formal amendment is
suggestive of this phenomenon. The legal barriers to formal
amendment of Japan’s constitution are relatively low; an
amendment can be proposed by a two-thirds majority in both
legislative chambers and ratified by a simple majority in a
national referendum.62 Despite this, Japan has never
formally amended its seventy-one-year-old constitution,
preferring instead to manage constitutional change through
informal processes.63 This is somewhat striking when one
considers that other, much younger, constitutions with
identical amendment processes have been amended.64
Greece and Ireland provide further examples. In Greece,
although barriers to formal amendment are relatively high,
“[p]ersistent constitutional violations before the enactment
of the current Constitution of 1975” have resulted in a strong
public preference for “formal constitutional procedure.”65 In
Ireland, formal amendment is relatively easy, but much

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 21, at 20–23.
62. NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 96, para. 1 (Japan).
63. See ELKINS ET AL., supra note 57.
64. Examples of countries with similar amendment procedures include: Peru
(seven amendments since adoption in 1993); Albania (two amendment since
adoption in 1998), Paraguay (one amendment since adoption in 1992). See ELKINS
ET AL., supra note 57.
65. Xenophon I. Contiades & Ioannis Tassopoulos, Constitutional Change in
Greece, in ENGINEERING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ON EUROPE, CANADA AND THE USA [hereinafter ENGINEERING] 151, 157 (Xenophōn
Contiades ed., 2013).
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constitutional change has occurred through constitutional
litigation.66 According to Fiona de Londras and David Gwynn
Morgan, the legislature has used flexible amendment rules
primarily to review constitutional changes endorsed by the
courts and not to affirmatively make changes.67 They
describe a culture where the legislature defers to the courts
to initiate changes through constitutional adjudication, and
the legislature then benefits from the opportunity to either
gain political support by overriding unpopular judicial
changes or avoid direct involvement in controversial issues
by allowing the courts to resolve political landmines.68 Other
examples exist, but the main point is that constitutional
culture can sometimes affect the pathways of constitutional
change notwithstanding otherwise low barriers to formal
amendment.
B. Hydraulics—but from the Reformer’s Perspective
Even if we assume that constitutional change will flow
toward the least restricted pathway, measuring the costs and
benefits of formal and informal change can be tricky. This is
because the assessment is most relevant when conducted
from the reformer’s perspective and not by comparing
amendment rates across jurisdictions. The core idea
underlying the hydraulics theory is that change is directed
by reformers who select the pathway to change that presents
the fewest barriers to their desired outcome. If this is true,
then the pathways of constitutional change are highly
dependent on the circumstances and objectives of the
particular reformer seeking change.
This point is perhaps most relevant to informal change
of individual rights through constitutional litigation. It
seems plausible that even under the most flexible
66. See Fiona de Londras & David Gwynn Morgan, Constitutional
Amendment in Ireland, in ENGINEERING, supra note 65, at 179–80.
67. See id. at 186–88.
68. See id. at 184.
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constitutional texts, reformers seeking change in the area of
civil liberties might pursue transformative judicial rulings
rather than formal amendments. Changes in civil rights
often pit minority groups against a majority refusing to
recognize protections for new groups. This dynamic can make
formal amendment a risky and difficult business for civil
rights reformers, even when barriers to formal amendment
are relatively low. Formal change requires the political
branches to mobilize around a policy, generalize that policy
in constitutional language, and secure popular support for
the change. Minority groups seeking protection from
majoritarian policies might understandably find these
dynamics too costly or even unsurmountable. They might
also fear that generalized constitutional language can be
easily evaded once implemented by the political branches.
Constitutional litigation, on the other hand, might
provide a much more attractive forum for pursing civil rights
change. Courts may be relatively more sympathetic to
minority interests because they are generally tasked with
checking the political branches through the enforcement of
individual rights. Courts are also likely to resolve
constitutional issues with sensitivity to the interests of the
individual litigants because courts ostensibly aim to
adjudicate discrete disputes rather than codify generally
applicable rules. This also means that litigants gain the
advantage of arguing for the specific relief that they want
under their particular circumstances.69
These considerations highlight just how contextual the
real hydraulics of constitutional change can be. Relatively
frequent formal amendment may not reveal the whole
picture. Constitutional change is likely directed by factors
unique to particular reformers and perhaps the subjectmatter of the reform itself.

69. Of course, the reverse is likely true. If courts do not enjoy independence
from the political branches or they are not accessible to litigants, constitutional
litigation might be too costly as a process of change.

2017] MYSTERY OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

1073

There is some anecdotal evidence to support these ideas.
Several European countries that experience frequent formal
amendment nevertheless report that changes in
constitutional rights tend to occur through constitutional
litigation.70 Manfred Stelzer has documented this
phenomenon in Austria,71 and Tuomas Ojanen observes
something similar in Finland.72 Fiona de Londras and David
Gwynn Morgan note that although the Irish Constitution is
relatively easy to amend, the Irish Supreme Court has been
especially active in developing individual rights.73
I have also found evidence of this under state
constitutions in the United States. State constitutions are
among the most frequently amended constitutions in the
world.74 On aggregate, current state constitutions have been
amended more than 7,400 times.75 In a recent study, I
compared formal amendments under state constitutions to
instances where state high courts independently changed
constitutional rules by overruling state constitutional
precedent.76 I found that on issues related to individual
rights, courts were more active in constitutional change than
formal amendment processes.77 This suggests that changes
in constitutional rights might be uniquely suited to informal
change through constitutional litigation. More importantly,
70. See Marshfield, Courts and Informal Constitutional Change, supra note
20, at 20–22 (discussing these examples).
71. See Manfred Stelzer, Constitutional Change in Austria, in ENGINEERING,
supra note 65, at 12, 14.
72. See Tuomas Ojanen, Constitutional Amendment in Finland, in
ENGINEERING, supra note 65, at 107.
73. See de Londras & Morgan, supra note 66, at 183 (noting that the Supreme
Court of Ireland has “deduced” “‘substantial unremunerated personal rights’” to
the extent of “about 20 aspects of protections of the person and personality,
including rights to privacy, to bodily integrity, and freedom from torture.”).
4.

74. Marshfield, Courts and Informal Constitutional Change, supra note 20, at
75. Id.
76. See id. at 3–7.
77. Id. at 6.

1074

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

these findings provide indirect support for the idea that the
hydraulics of constitutional change are contextual.
C. Political Strategy in a Frequent-Amendment Game
Another underappreciated influence on constitutional
change is the effect that frequent formal amendment might
have on political strategy. Under prevailing theories, formal
and informal change are assumed to be alternative
mechanisms for addressing the same pressures for change.
The two pathways compensate for each other. Thus, if
change occurs through informal methods, then pressures for
a related formal change presumably subside. This account
makes sense under a rigid constitutional text where formal
amendment pathways are blocked. Under those conditions,
constitutional change will occur almost exclusively through
informal processes without any opportunities for interaction
between formal and informal changes.
These two pathways might have a more complicated
relationship if formal amendment is frequent. Gabriel
Negretto has theorized, for example, that formal and
informal methods of constitutional change may actually
proliferate each other.78 He explains that in a system where
the courts have strong powers of judicial review and the
constitution is amended frequently, judicial involvement in
constitutional change may accelerate as formal amendments
increase.79 This is because new constitutional provisions will
generate more constitutional litigation challenging
legislation and executive action. Cases resolving those
disputes will likely generate more formal amendments
overriding controversial judicial rulings, which will in turn
generate a new series of constitutional cases, and so on.
Negretto’s proliferation theory aligns with basic political
strategy. When opponents of a formal amendment lose, they

78. See Negretto, supra note 27, at 761.
79. See id. at 750.
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will likely pursue their agenda in court by testing the limits
of the formal amendment. This will result in courts using
their power of judicial review to uphold or strike challenged
government action. If proponents of the original amendment
are threatened by those rulings, they will likely pursue
responsive formal amendments, restarting the process.
Because both pathways of constitutional change are open
and accessible, they provide a “winners’ forum” and a “losers’
forum” that can perpetuate the debate.
Negretto tested his hypothesis using data from eighteen
Latin American countries from 1946–2008, and found
support for his theory that formal amendment flexibility can
increase informal change through judicial review.80
Similarly, in another recent study of state constitutional
change in the United States, I found evidence of a catalyzing
effect between formal and informal amendment.81 I
discovered that in states with relatively high rates of formal
amendment (e.g., California, Texas, Alabama, Oklahoma),
courts often remain relatively more active in constitutional
change.82 These findings support the idea that formal and
informal processes of constitutional change are not always
mutually exclusive alternatives. They can interact with and
catalyze each other—especially in jurisdictions where both
pathways to change remain open.
CONCLUSION—IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Constitution makers around the world have embraced
the possibility of designing amendment rules that can
effectively direct and manage constitutional change. But
many mysteries remain. Constitutional change is directed by

80. Id. at 774 (“The strength of constitutional adjudication is positively and
significantly correlated with the rate of amendments. This provides prima facie
evidence that amendments and constitutional adjudication . . . may reinforce or
complement each other as means of constitutional adaptation.”).
81. See Marshfield, Amendment Effect, supra note 20, at 47, Fig. 2.
82. See id.
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diverse forces that are often underappreciated, highly
contextual, and sometimes interactive. Democratic maturity,
constitutional culture, and political strategy are just a few of
the forces that likely act upon the direction of constitutional
change.
The field of constitutional design is united around a core
idea: the formal structure of political institutions can
influence the actual practice of politics. This idea energizes
the study of how best to design constitutions under varying
circumstances and given varying objectives. In this regard,
the field of constitutional design must respect the
understudied influences on constitutional change. In many
countries, constitutional change cannot be reliably managed
based on a general hydraulics theory. The interaction
between formal and informal processes of change demands
more rigorous investigation and nuanced conceptualization.
There are many mysteries to constitutional change, but they
can surely be demystified if we respect the complexity that
likely drives the process.

